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A new study by Klaes et al. in this issue of Neuron shows that the brain can simultaneously apply two rules to
the same sensory information in order to specify two parallel potential action goals, which then compete for
execution in the sensorimotor system.Our lives are filled with decisions. Some of
these are complex choices, such as
whether to enroll in one university course
or another. Some decisions are much
simpler, such as selecting whether to
reach toward a cup of coffee or a muffin.
Still other kinds of choices involve the
application of abstract rules to specific
actions, such as whether to push the
brake or the accelerator at a yellow light.
What are the mechanisms by which the
brain makes such decisions? Do we
select between rules (stop versus go) or
actions (press one pedal versus another)?
In what form does the brain represent
these situations? In recent years, many
studies have addressed such questions
by recording neural activity from animals
while they make decisions. A large body
of literature on saccade-selection tasks
has shown that factors relevant for
decisions modulate neural activity within
the circuit that controls eye movements,
including parietal cortex (Platt and
Glimcher, 1999) and superior colliculus
(Basso and Wurtz, 1998). Recordings in
the sensorimotor circuits that control the
arm have shown that before a decision
between actions is made, neural activity
represents the potential actions in
dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2005) and the parietal reach
region (PRR) (Scherberger and Andersen,
2007).However, themechanisms involved
are still far fromunderstood. In this issueof
Neuron, Klaes et al. (2011) provide impor-
tant pieces of the puzzle by addressing
two questions: (1) do we select between
abstract rules (e.g., stop versus go at
a yellow light), or concrete action goals
(e.g., press the accelerator or brake
pedal), when making decisions? (2) Does
the brain make decisions by encoding all
availablemovementoptionsor the subjec-
tive preferences of the subject?382 Neuron 70, May 12, 2011 ª2011 ElsevierKlaes et al. trained monkeys to make
reaching movements either toward the
location where a stimulus appeared
(‘‘direct goal’’), or toward a location in
the opposite direction (‘‘inferred goal’’).
This stimulus appeared 800–2000 ms
before a GO signal, which sometimes
indicated the correct rule with a color
cue (green for direct, blue for inferred),
and sometimes the monkey was allowed
to choose freely. Because the monkeys
did not know ahead of time whether their
choice would be free, Klaes et al. could
examine the pre-GO activity to get a
glimpse of the strategies the monkeys
used to make their choices. One possi-
bility is that they first selected their
preferred rule and then prepared the
action associated with it, as illustrated in
Figure 1A. An alternative possibility is
that they instead applied both rules and
prepared both actions simultaneously,
allowing the actions to compete against
each other, as in Figure 1B. Neural
recordings in PRR and PMd revealed
simultaneous preparation of both actions
in parallel, supporting the latter scheme
(or alternatively, the scheme shown in
Figure 1C, in which competition occurs
between rules as well as actions). Parallel
action preparation has previously been
shown in PMd (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005)
and PRR (Scherberger and Andersen,
2007), but in those studies the actions
were specified by distinct stimulus cues.
Here, Klaes et al. show that a single stim-
ulus can specify two actions, revealing the
simultaneous application of two different
transformation rules in parallel.
Interestingly, the direct goal engaged
neural activity earlier than the inferred,
consistent with prior studies showing that
responses oriented directly toward stimuli
are processed more quickly than re-
sponses requiring remapping (CrammondInc.and Kalaska, 1994). This suggests that
the information for specifying the direct
goal may be processed along a simple
parietal-to-frontal route, while information
for specifying the inferred goal may need
to pass through prefrontal cortex and
then be sent back to premotor and parietal
regions. Indeed, an earlier study from the
same lab showed that unlike direct goals,
inferred goals were represented in PMd
before appearing in PRR (Westendorff
et al., 2010).
Of course, in many situations, we make
decisions that are unrelated to any
particular action.Whenchoosingbetween
university courses, one presumably is not
planning routes for walking to class.
Obviously the brain is capable of making
abstract decisions that do not involve
action, and many studies have examined
the neural mechanisms which may be
involved. For example, in a paradigm
similar to that used in Klaes et al. (2011),
Bennur and Gold (2011) compared how
monkeys judged the direction of visual
motion when they either did or did not
know what saccadic response would be
used to report their decision. It was found
that even before a saccade plan could be
made, some cells in parietal cortex were
selective for the motion direction of the
visual stimulus. In the reach-planning
system, Nakayama et al. (2008) showed
that premotor activity is selective even
when monkeys are only given a ‘‘virtual’’
action plan, specifying whether the right-
most or leftmost of two stimuli will be the
target for movement but the locations of
the stimuli themselves are still not known.
In fact, the very same monkeys studied
by Klaes et al. were very familiar with
this kind of situation, having previously
been trained on tasks in which the rule
was indicated before the spatial target
(Westendorff et al., 2010). In those cases,
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Figure 1. Three Possible Information-Processing Schemes under ‘‘Free-Choice’’ Conditions
for Competition between Rules, Action Goals, or Both
Arrows indicate transformations of visual information (green box) through neural representations (orange
boxes), and rounded arrows represent inhibitory interactions (thicker line indicates stronger inhibition).
Rule selection in (A) implies that the competition is resolved first at an abstract level (green versus blue
square cues), in this case favoring the ‘‘inferred rule’’ before any action goals are specified. Alternatively
(B), both rules could be applied to generate two goals, which then compete, in this case with the ‘‘inferred
goal’’ winning. In (C), both kinds of competition take place at the same time. Klaes et al. suggest the
process shown in (B), although their data is not incompatible with the multilevel competition shown in (C).
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place between the rules, and then later,
also between the actions (Figure 1C).
Since animals are clearly capable of
making decisions between abstract rules,
thenwhy should they, in situations such as
the experiment of Klaes et al., bother to
simultaneously apply two rules to prepare
two actions, only one of which can physi-
cally be performed? One answer, as
Klaes et al. suggest, may be that doing
so allows animals to make more informed
choices. If one is able to define both
actions, then one’s decision can be influ-
enced by factors related to the move-
ments themselves, such as the energy
required to produce them or their likeli-
hood of success. For example, a tennis
player should favor selecting strokes at
which she ismore proficient. In agreement
with this, a recent study in our lab demon-
strated that when humans are allowed to
make freechoicesbetweenequally valued
targets, they prefer movements thatminimize biomechanical costs (Cos et al.,
2011). In other words, if the brain can
prepare multiple actions in parallel, then
it can consider features of their execution
and take these into account during selec-
tion. Furthermore, selecting actions may
bemore fundamental fromanevolutionary
perspective (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). At
the time the fundamental outline of our
neural architecturewasbeingestablished,
animals were selecting between move-
ment directions for escaping a predator,
not between university courses.
The second question addressed by
Klaes et al. is whether the neural activity
theyobserved inPRRandPMdobjectively
reflects the options that were presented,
or whether it reflects the monkeys’ own
subjective preferences. To examine the
role of subjective preference, if any, in
decision making, the authors exploited
the monkeys’ spontaneously adopted
strategy in the absence of external biases:
when given a free choice, both monkeysNeurontended to preferentially select the inferred
goal over the direct goal. This might
appear counterintuitive, since the direct
action is clearly easier. However, the
monkeys perforce required more training
to learn the inferred goal than the easier
direct goal. Furthermore, favoring the in-
ferred target may also be strategic, since
it is easy to switch to the direct action if
so instructed. Nevertheless, whatever
the reason for the monkeys’ preference,
it provided Klaes et al. the opportunity to
examine whether neural activity was
related to the objective options or to sub-
jective preferences and strategies. For
these experiments, the monkeys were
trained on two different reward schedules.
In the ‘‘balanced set’’ schedule, the prob-
ability of reward for repeated choices was
reduced, encouraging balanced choice
behavior. In the ‘‘biased set’’ schedule,
the monkeys were not penalized for any
strategy, and both spontaneously adop-
ted a bias in favor of the inferred action.
Recordings in the two conditions showed
that, in both PRR and PMd, neural activity
reflected the current strategy: during the
balanced set, when monkeys’ choices
were approximately equal between direct
and inferred targets, both movement
goals were approximately equally repre-
sented in neural activity. In contrast,
during the biased set, activity related to
the inferred goal was much stronger than
activity related to thedirect goal, reflecting
the monkeys’ preference.
This finding supports the hypothesis
that the brain prepares multiple actions
in parallel and selects between them
throughbiased competition in the sensori-
motor system (Cisek, 2006; Shadlen et al.,
2008). This competition can be biased by
many factors, suchas expected gain (Platt
andGlimcher, 1999), subjective strategies
(Dorris andGlimcher, 2004), or indeed any
factor relevant to the choice. Dorris and
Glimcher (2004) proposed the term ‘‘rela-
tive subjective desirability’’ to imply that
what modulates neural activity during
decision tasks is a subjective variable
that depends upon the relative desirability
of one option versus another. Klaes et al.
show that themodulation of neural activity
is indeed related to subjective desirability.
A recent study in our lab (Pastor-Bernier
and Cisek, 2011) shows that this neural
modulation is related to relative, rather
than absolute, desirability. In our study,70, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 383
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targets whose stimulus features indicated
how many drops of juice each was worth,
and we examined whether neural activity
in PMd reflected a competition between
the two potential reaching actions. As
expected, we found that neural activity
increased as the value of the preferred
target increased while the other target’s
value was constant. We also found that if
we kept the preferred target’s value
constant and increased the other target’s
value, neural activity decreased, suggest-
ing a competitive interaction. Most impor-
tantly, if only a single targetwas presented
then neural activity was completely insen-
sitive to its value—strongly suggesting
that in all cases, activity specifying poten-
tial actions is modulated by the subjective
desirability of those actions relative to
other options. This further strengthens
the proposal made by Klaes et al. that
the modulation of activity in PMd and
PRR reflects subjective preferences for
one action goal over another.
The question of how the brain makes
decisions is the topic of many recent
and ongoing studies. Klaes et al. provide
a critical piece of the puzzle by showing
that the brain is capable of simultaneously
applying two rules to the same sensory
information in order to specify two parallel
potential action goals in the sensorimotor
regions of frontal and parietal cortex. They384 Neuron 70, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elseviershow that these activities do not simply
reflect sensory information, nor do they
simply reflect the motor options, but that
they reveal the animals’ strategies and
subjective preferences. Taken together
with other studies cited here and in
Klaes et al., these findings support an
‘‘intentional’’ framework for sensorimotor
behavior (Shadlen et al., 2008), whereby
the brain makes decisions about actions
through a biased competition taking
place within the same system that
guides the execution of those actions
(Cisek, 2006). Although the brain can
also make purely perceptual decisions
in situations where no response has yet
been specified (e.g., Bennur and Gold,
2011), the strategy of specifying multiple
potential actions appears to be adopted
in all situations in which it is possible.
Given that for many millions of years,
decisions were almost exclusively related
to the selection of actions (fight versus
flight, rest versus forage, turn left versus
turn right), it makes sense that the
architecture for making decisions has
evolved to be so strongly integrated
with sensorimotor control (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010).REFERENCES
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